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 Economic Mobility and Fiscal Federalism: Taxation and European Responses in a 
Changing Constitutional Context 




In this article we explore the claim that the four freedoms of the EU lead to the inevitable 
erosion of the capacity of Member States to collect tax, undermining national systems of 
welfare and solidarity. We argue that European tax integration has undergone a significant 
change during the last ten years or so, with a judicial, regulatory and legislative response by 
Union institutions. First, the Court of Justice has recalibrated some of the basic concepts it 
applies when reviewing the European constitutionality of national tax norms. Second, the 
Commission has utilised state aid rules to attack targeted tax competition. Third, important 
legislative initiatives have been adopted or proposed to safeguard Member State taxing 
capacities. The new phase is influenced by the changed constitutional context of the recent 





In this article we explore the claim that the four freedoms of the EU, in particular the free 
movement of capital but also the right of establishment, lead to an inevitable erosion of the 
capacity of Member States to collect taxes. It has been argued that corporations are able to 
rely on the four freedoms against national tax authorities and arrange their affairs so that 
profits are allocated to low tax jurisdictions and losses to high tax ones, or where they enjoy 
double deductions or double non-taxation.1 Further, it is sometimes claimed that the single 
market necessarily results in a race to the bottom on tax, as Member States engage in a 
destructive spiral of competition to attract mobile capital through ever lower taxes. This 
would lead either to pressure to cut welfare benefits and public services, or shift the tax 
burden elsewhere—for example by means of raising consumption taxes or personal income 
                                                        
1 These kinds of concerns were expressed by several Member States and accepted by the 
Court in Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, ECLI:EU:C:2005:763, paras 42–51. They have since 
been raised also on the international level; see OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (OECD Publishing, 2013). 
tax—thus possibly resulting in unfair patterns of allocation of taxes.2 In a nutshell, the charge 
is that the EU is undermining national systems of welfare and solidarity,3 without replacing 
them with a European one. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: we first outline the EU tax framework and the 
interdependence it creates among the Member States, as well as the effects of this framework 
on national taxation. We will suggest on the basis of empirical evidence that while the 
capacity to tax has not been eroded as a whole, some of the tax burden might have been 
shifted from mobile taxpayers to immobile ones. We then proceed to consider the actions that 
the EU institutions have taken, or are in the process of taking, to address these issues. We 
identify a judicial response, a regulatory response, and a legislative response. Our claim is that 
the legal situation is far more nuanced today than fifteen or even ten years ago, and that the 
various EU institutions are engaged in a set of actions that, taken together, may amount to a 
broad-based and reasonably coherent attempt to address the challenges. Further, we point 
out the changing constitutional context that is both increasing the ‘supply’ of and the ‘demand’ 
for EU action on tax. We conclude that the fundamental variable is not the law of the EU, but 
rather political will. 
 
II European Integration and Constraints on National Taxation  
 
A The European Union as a Legal Framework for Fiscal Interdependence 
 
The creation of a single market among states with different national tax systems (and tax law 
traditions) was bound to result in enduring tensions between the European Union and its 
Member States. On the one hand, national tax norms have been regarded as obstacles to the 
effective establishment of a single market. On the other hand, market integration has been 
said to constrain the fiscal and redistributive capacities of national tax systems by fostering 
                                                        
2 See eg the list of concerns outlined in Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Corporate 
Income Taxation in the European Union’ SWD(2015) 121 final, at 11–12. 
3 See also the article of M. Ferrera in this issue, which focuses on free movement of persons. 
fiscal interdependence and, as a consequence, tax competition4 between Member States. The 
Europeanisation of national tax systems has been marked by two dynamics.5  
 
First is the establishment of the internal market. The 1957 Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community set as objectives the realisation of free movement of goods, the right of 
establishment, free movement of workers, free provision of services, and—to a lesser 
extent—free movement of capital.6 Realisation of economic freedoms required removing 
national norms and practices which hindered cross-border economic activities. The removal 
of restrictions was to take place through adoption of Community legislation.7 From the 1970s 
onwards, the role of the freedoms in building the internal market became more salient.8 A 
preliminary step in this process was their constitutionalisation.9 Through decisions of the 
Court of Justice, the freedoms were granted two constitutional qualities: direct effect and 
primacy over national law.10 The freedoms were transformed from principles that guided 
Community legislation to subjective rights that could be invoked directly by private economic 
actors.11 Further, the substantive scope of these rights was expanded in the free movement 
                                                        
4 We emphasise the difference between tax competition and fiscal interdependence, of which 
the latter serves as a precondition for the former; see P. Dietsch, Catching Capital. The Ethics 
of Tax Competition (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 36, 77–80.  
5 For further reasons, see P. Genschel, A. Kemmerling and E. Seils, ‘Accelerating Downhill: How 
the EU Shapes Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market’, (2011) 49 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 585–606, at 587–589.  
6 On the initially supplementary role of the free movement of capital, see eg J. Snell, ‘Free 
Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-Linear Process’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011), 547–574, at 548–551 and J. A. 
Usher, ‘The Evolution of the Free Movement of Capital’, (2007) 31 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1533–1570.  
7 P. Craig, ‘The Evolution of the Single Market’, in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds), The Law of the 
Single European Market (Hart, 2002), 1–40, at 4.  
8 For an overview of the transformation of economic freedoms, see J. Snell ‘The Internal 
Market and the Philosophies of Market Integration’, in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds), European 
Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 300–324, at 307–315. 
9 See J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, in idem, The constitution of Europe. ‘Do 
the new clothes have an emperor?’ and other essays on European integration (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 10–101, at 16–39. 
10 Case 26/62 Van Gend, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 and Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
11 D. Grimm, ‘Europe’s legitimacy problem and the courts’, in D. Chalmers, M. Jachtenfuchs and 
C. Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 241–265, at 245.  
case law of the Court from the 1970s onwards.12 The constitutionalisation of the Treaties or—
more precisely—the incorporation of the formal functions of national constitutions into 
European law eventually came to mean that the constitutionality of all kinds of national legal 
norms could be reviewed by the Court against internal market rules. The realisation of 
economic freedoms and removal of obstacles to cross-border economic activities through 
legislative and judicial integration gradually rendered capital and corporations factually 
mobile within the European market. 
 
As a result, national income tax laws became subject to review of their European 
constitutionality.13 Member State tax systems could be assessed against the economic 
freedoms like any other national law or regulatory practice, although the intensity of the 
review may differ, as explained in Section IIIA. The possibility of review was explicitly 
established by the Court in Avoir Fiscal.14 In Schumacker, the Court set out its basic doctrine 
on review of personal income taxation, which has remained rather the same since. The Court 
stated that while Member States retained the power to shape income taxes, states must 
nevertheless exercise their power in a fashion consistent with Community law.15 Thus, 
national tax legislation must to an extent be in line with economic freedoms as constructed by 
the CJEU. European constitutional review of national income tax laws has had a wide-reaching 
influence on national tax systems, among other reasons because review has proceeded on the 
basis of criteria unfamiliar to national constitutional law. Not many constitutions include 
principles such as free movement of capital against which the legality of tax laws would be 
assessed. From this perspective, the matter became potentially even more acute when the 
economic freedoms were pushed beyond non-discrimination and opened to a more 
substantive reading.16 As a consequence, the Court has held many national tax norms to be in 
                                                        
12 See eg A. J. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’, (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 453–526, at 471–484. 
13 S. van Thiel, ‘The Direct Income Tax Case Law of the European Court of Justice: Past Trends 
and Future Developments’, (2008) 62 Tax Law Review, 143–192, at 148, 178 and R. Barents, 
‘The Single Market and National Tax Sovereignty’, in S. J. J. M. Jansen (ed), Fiscal Sovereignty of 
the Member States in an Internal Market (Kluwer Law International, 2011), 51–71, at 59.  
14 Case 270/83, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:1986:37.  
15 Case 279/93, Schumacker, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31, para 21. 
16 Menéndez, n 12 above, at 480. Especially in the context of taxation, see A. J. Menéndez, ‘The 
Unencumbered European Taxpayer as the Product of the Transformation of Personal Taxes 
by the Judicial Empowerment of “Market Forces”’, in R. Letelier and A. J. Menéndez (eds), 
breach of the free movement rules. This may well have eroded the integrity and coherence of 
national tax systems. At any rate, it has constrained the capacity of Member States to design 
their tax systems in a fully autonomous fashion; the effects of this limitation having been 
amplified by the very economic mobility fostered by economic integration.  
 
The second dynamic that has determined the shape of the Europeanisation of national tax 
systems is the very limited harmonisation of national income taxation. This is largely the 
result of the allocation of tax competences between the EU and the Member States. The 
founding Treaties did not contain provisions conferring legislative powers upon the 
Communities in the field of income taxation. This remains the case. It is true that the Treaties 
foresee the approximation of Member States’ laws in general, and that this could serve as a 
legal basis for the harmonisation of national income taxation. However, it is also true that 
Article 114 TFEU excludes ‘fiscal provisions’ from the scope of qualified majority voting. As a 
result, the eventual harmonisation of national income tax law would only be possible if the 
Council of Ministers unanimously approved the Commission’s proposals.17 The only exception 
to this rule would be European tax legislation aimed at eliminating distortions to the 
conditions of competition in the internal market.18 However, the latter has not been made use 
of.19 In consequence, the actual capacity of the Union to legislate on income taxation is rather 
weak in comparison with the power that Member States, at least formally, enjoy.  
 
As a result, regulations and directives on income tax law are few and national income tax laws 
have not been harmonised.20 As we will see, this has created the conditions under which 
Europeanisation of national income tax laws has been led by the CJEU, most especially so once 
the Court started favouring an expansive understanding of economic freedoms in the late 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Sinews of European Peace: Reconstituting the Democratic Legitimacy of the Socio-Economic 
Constitution of the European Union (2009) Arena Report 7, 157–268, at 207–230. 
17 Art 115 TFEU.  
18 Art 116 TFEU.  
19 In this context, the Spaak Report assumed that only specific distortions that affect certain 
sectors would be targeted. See ‘Rapport des Chefs de Délégation’, Bruxelles, 21 avril 1956, 
Mae 120 f/56 (corrigé), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/996/1/Spaak_report_french.pdf, at 61.  
20 The absence of secondary legislation on income taxation is often derived from the 
requirement of unanimity alone. Although the requirement of unanimity is a genuine 
procedural obstacle to tax integration, the existence of the requirement itself is an expression 
of the more fundamental reasons that render income taxation such an integration-resistant 
policy area. See P. Genschel, Steuerwettbewerb und Steuerharmonisierung in der Europäischen 
Union (Campus, 2002), at 18. See below Section IIB.  
1970s. It could indeed be said that an inverse proportional relationship exists between the 
degree to which we can find European secondary legislation in each policy field and the 
‘demand’ for judicial rulings determining the impact of economic freedoms in that field.21 It 
should be further added that the few secondary income tax directives that have been adopted 
have failed to balance all the interests involved. Free movement has been furthered, but 
without taking fully into account the complexities of taxation of cross-border economic 
activity. A paramount example in that regard is the Interest and Royalty Directive.22 The 
Directive provides that interest and royalty payments among associated companies resident 
in different Member States will not be taxed at source. This ensures that this income is not 
taxed twice. However, as was pointed by several national governments and indeed by scholars 
at the time, the serious risk arises of double non-taxation, or what is the same, of these 
payments not being subject to tax either at source or at destination.23 Indeed, the Directive 
encourages companies to lobby states to procure national tax legislation that guarantees such 
a result. This may have exacerbated thin capitalisation of companies (that is, the 
disproportion between capital and debt of a company), given that debt is instrumental in the 
design of economic transactions so that they escape from taxation in all Member States. To 
put it differently, the very limited set of European secondary legislation on income taxation 
has fostered negative integration in the name of favouring capital mobility, and the few 
directives that have been adopted have also followed the logic of negative integration.24 
 
To recapitulate, formally speaking Member States have retained the power to define income 
taxation. However, market integration has removed many obstacles, including tax obstacles, 
                                                        
21 T. Kingreen, ‘Fundamental Freedoms’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (Hart–Beck, 2nd revised edn, 2011), 515–549, at 526. 
22 Dir 2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty 
payments made between associated companies of different Member States, OJ L 157, of 
26.6.2003, 49–154. 
23 It was against this background that the Commission proposed, soon after adoption of the 
original directive, that interest and royalty payments should be exempted from source 
country taxation only on the condition that they were subject to tax in the country of 
destination; see Commission ‘Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 
2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments 
made between associated companies of different Member States’ COM(2003) 841 final. The 
amendment was, however, not endorsed by the Council.  
24 Negative integration refers to the de-regulatory integration designed to remove national 
market obstacles whereas positive integration refers to re-regulatory construction of market 
conditions at the European level. See F. W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and 
Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 45.  
to cross-border economic activity in Europe. As a result, taxpayers (most especially 
individuals with high capital income and corporate taxpayers) can rearrange their economic 
activities (mainly financial activities) so as to pay taxes where the rates are lower (this is what 
is usually referred as tax base mobility). This results in a bifurcated system of income taxation. 
On the one hand, taxpayers that are less mobile are still fully subject to national tax laws. On 
the other hand, mobile taxpayers can exploit the plurality of unharmonised national tax 
systems to rearrange the financial structure of their economic activity or shift profits from one 
tax jurisdiction to another. The asymmetry between market integration and tax 
harmonisation creates the conditions of tax base mobility, while the sparse harmonisation of 
tax law generates incentives for taxpayers to exploit tax base mobility. This is the concrete 
shape of Europeanisation of income tax law at present. 
 
B Fiscal Interdependence and National Taxation  
 
The lack of European income tax harmonisation is not a coincidence. Retention of fiscal 
powers at the national level and failure to engage in tax harmonisation at the European level 
reflect Member States’ endeavour to preserve national tax sovereignty, or what is the same, 
self-determination in income tax matters. The political preference has been to retain tax 
policy in the hands of the national political process. The normative justification for this could 
be the need to safeguard the democratic legitimacy of taxation, which we interpret as 
requiring that taxpayers have representation in the political process where taxes are 
instituted and designed. 
 
However, the credibility and desirability of national tax autonomy can be questioned, 
precisely on account of the interdependence between tax systems that unavoidably results 
from market integration. The repertoire of tax policy alternatives factually available for one 
Member State is dependent on and conditioned by the tax policies of other Member States, as 
the influence of national tax policies beyond national boundaries unavoidably follows from 
economic freedoms. Decision-making is national but its effects are European. Therefore, while 
formal or legal tax autonomy may still be proclaimed, economic freedoms drastically 
constrain actual tax autonomy. Further, it could be argued that the interplay between market 
integration and markedly weak tax harmonisation results in democratic under-inclusiveness. 
When national decision-making in one Member State affects other Member States but the 
citizens of the latter cannot participate in the decision-making process of the former, 
democratic decision-making becomes under-inclusive.25 This pathology could be reduced 
through the joint exercise of powers at the European level since decision-making would 
include representation from all Member States.26 As a result, efforts to safeguard the 
democratic legitimacy of national tax law by abstaining from tax harmonisation may be bound 
to be counterproductive.27  
 
From that perspective, it could be argued that economic freedoms also promote democratic 
inclusiveness. Tax laws are enacted by national parliaments, while the right to vote in 
parliamentary elections is based on citizenship. However, tax liability is not based on 
citizenship but residence or source country of income. This generates incongruence between 
the right to participate and the obligation to pay. Taking seriously the nexus between 
representation and taxation, one is bound to ask to what extent it is legitimate to impose a tax 
on a foreigner, who has undoubtedly benefited from the infrastructure and public services 
paid for by taxation, but who had no representation when the tax was designed, especially if 
the tax has particularly harsh consequences for them. It has been claimed that the four 
freedoms enhance democracy—they ensure judicial protection for those who have not been 
heard in a national political process.28  
 
Acknowledging that the economic freedoms also enhance representation, the question 
remains: who benefits from the freedoms? The immediate beneficiaries are capital holders 
and corporations because of their high mobility. Due to the comparatively immobile nature of 
                                                        
25 For this line of argumentation, see A. J. Menéndez, ‘Another View of the Democratic Deficit: 
No Taxation without Representation’, in C. Joerges, Y. Mény and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), What 
Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (European University 
Institute, 2000), 125–138, at 131–135. 
26 Alternatively, integration could be scaled back dramatically, although this would not 
remedy the problem completely without further action to limit the effects of globalisation. 
27 For this counterintuitive tendency, see P. Genschel and M. Jachtenfuchs, ‘How the European 
Union Constrains the State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation’, (2011) 50 European Journal of 
Political Research 293–314, at 294, 306–309. 
28 See for the seminal text from the US perspective J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory 
of Judicial Review (Harvard, 1980), at 73–104. See also M. Poiares Maduro, We The Court: The 
European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart, 1998), eg at 173 and 
C. Joerges, ‘What Is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy’, 
(2005) 30 European Law Review 461–489, at 488, and for critical remarks A. Somek, ‘The 
Darling Dogma of Bourgeois Europeanists’, (2014) 20 European Law Journal 688–712.  
labour, the benefits may be divided in an unbalanced manner between capital holders and 
workers.29 Some of the empirical research on tax competition suggests that this imbalance can 
also be seen as regards taxation. Competition may have exerted a downward pressure on the 
level of corporate and capital income taxation. In order to cope with the threat of diminishing 
tax revenues, states may have shifted the tax burden from mobile to immobile tax bases—that 
is, from capital and corporate income to labour.30 If true, the shift might represent an unfair 
allocation of the tax burden between taxpayers and change the redistributive logic of national 
tax systems. Because redistribution has, by tradition, been one of the primary methods of 
reinforcing the social and democratic credentials of a modern state,31 any alteration of the 
redistributive balance touches a raw nerve, as it has a major influence on the way in which 
one of the fundamental functions of taxation is carried out. Consequently, fiscal 
interdependence presents a challenge to one of the key functions of tax law in a democratic 
polity, as it seems to undermine the capacity to create factual conditions for equal 
participation through taxation. This is connected to the wider challenge of reconciling the 
normative ethos of supranational and national constitutional law. Interpreting the economic 
freedoms as individual liberty rights has been claimed to contribute to the empowerment of a 
liberal state ideal over a republican one, something which would have altered the balance 
between different conceptions of the state as reflected in national constitutional traditions.32 
In fact, Hayek even saw a move to ‘an essentially liberal economic regime [as] a necessary 
condition for the success of any interstate federation.’33  
 
                                                        
29 F. W. Scharpf, ‘Globalisierung als Beschränkung der Handlungsmöglichkeiten 
nationalstaatlicher Politik’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 97/1, available at 
http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp97-1.pdf, at 11.  
30 P. Genschel and P. Schwarz, ‘Tax Competition and Fiscal Democracy’, in A. Schäfer and W. 
Streeck (eds), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Polity, 2015), 59–83, at 63–72, 75–76. For an 
overview of the discussion, see P. Genschel and P. Schwarz, ‘Tax competition: a literature 
review’, (2011) 9 Socio-Economic Review 339–370, at 342–351.  
31 See also the article by M. Ferrera in this issue. 
32 See F. W. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multi-level European Polity’, in P. Dobner and M. 
Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2010), 89–119, at 
111–117. 
33 F.A. Hayek, ‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism’, in idem, Individualism and 
Economic Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948), at 269. 
It seems to us, however, that it is important to keep arguments within proportion. First, there 
is no aggregate reduction of tax yields.34 For corporate income tax, the aggregate level of 
revenue contribution has not changed significantly in recent years—this is known as the 
‘corporate income rate-revenue paradox’—although this may mask a reduction in real terms, 
given that the share of capital in income has increased.35 For labour, the figures for implicit 
tax rates 1995-2012 and tax wedges for low wage workers 2002-2012 fail to reveal any clear 
patterns.36 Secondly, tax competition is not inherently bad, but may also produce beneficial 
results. For example, EU fiscal interdependence may have resulted in lower but broader 
corporate tax rates37—a result that brings fewer distortions and less complexity. Thirdly, and 
more controversially, public choice argues that competition among jurisdictions is beneficial 
in taming the Leviathan.38 The fear is that the state and self-interested public officials in 
control of its offices have a tendency to engage in excessive taxation and in squandering the 
proceeds. Democracy may only provide an imperfect constraint on such a tendency. 
Politicians may decide on taxes and spending to bribe key constituencies in the hopes of re-
election rather than to improve the public weal. It can be argued that competition from other 
jurisdictions may serve a useful function in constraining public power. Exit is added to the 
voice that democracy supplies.39 What these arguments suggest is that rather than 
condemning all tax competition outright, the need is to identify and take action against those 
forms of tax competition that are harmful. For example, it might be argued that ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ targeted tax competition designed to attract particular companies with specific tax 
incentives is unlikely to have redeeming virtues, while lowering of tax rates as a result of the 
                                                        




35 ‘Corporate Income Taxation in the European Union’, n 2 above, at 19–20. 
36 Eurostat, ‘Taxation Trends in the European Union 2014’, at 28 and 30, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/g
en_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/2014/report.pdf. See also Commission, ‘Tax 
Reforms in EU Member States 2015’ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip008_en.pdf, at 108–109. 
37 ‘Corporate Income Taxation in the European Union’, n 2 above, Annex I. 
38 G. Brennan and J.M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal 
Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 1980), in particular Ch 9. 
39 The argument is not that tax havens or tax avoidance are just or efficient. Rather, the ability 
of taxpayers to locate their activities in a jurisdiction where a certain level of infrastructure 
and public services are provided at the lowest cost in terms of the tax burden serves to spur 
countries to greater efficiency and innovation. 
broadening of the tax base or to reflect more efficient delivery of public services is beneficial, 
even if it puts pressure on other countries.40 Finally, it could well be argued that the same 
pattern can be observed in non-EU countries, so the transformation of national tax systems is 
to be considered within the context of globalisation. This entails that Member States would 
find themselves in much the same situation even if they had not joined the EU (or were to 
leave it).  
 
III The Response of the EU Institutions 
 
In this section, we focus on the way EU institutions have reacted in recent years to the 
challenge of reconciling European integration with effective taxation. We distinguish a 
judicial, a regulatory, and a legislative response. It is important to highlight that all three 
responses go in the same direction, namely, the protection of Member State ability to collect 
taxes, either through a (re-)calibrated understanding of economic freedoms, a targeted use of 
the power to monitor state aid, or by proposing legislative initiatives. In addition, it should be 
observed that the institutional pattern is more complex (and thus richer) than in the past. A 
fair balance between the conflicting demands of market integration and national tax 
autonomy is not being aimed at exclusively by the judiciary, but this time around political 
institutions are also involved.41  
 
A The Judicial Response: The Change of Approach by the Court of Justice 
 
The extent to which market integration compromises the ability of Member States to collect 
income tax depends to a large degree on the concrete way in which economic freedoms are 
defined and implemented. Paramount here is the influence of the jurisprudence of the Court. 
The European judges interpret the abstract rules of the Treaty and set out their meaning in 
practice. What is important to realise is that in the last ten years or so the case law of the CJEU 
                                                        
40 It may in practice be difficult to decide whether a particular instance of competition is 
harmful. The EU has adopted a code of conduct and established a monitoring group for these 
purposes; see ‘Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation’, OJ C 2, of 6.1.1998, 2–5. 
41 It is notorious that the EU legislature has stayed away from the field of direct taxes in the 
past, producing only a handful of substantive directives with limited scope, while the Court 
has handed down well over 200 rulings on these matters. The Commission’s energetic use of 
state aid powers against national tax measures is also a relatively recent development. 
affecting the interplay between economic freedoms and tax law has changed. The Court has 
recognised that its earlier jurisprudence may have gone too far; consequently, its rulings have 
become more accommodating towards Member State concerns. 42 The case law has evolved in 
respect of the two main elements of free movement law—both the notion of restriction on 
economic freedoms and the definition of justifications of limitations to economic freedoms 
have undergone substantial changes.43 In the following we consider them in turn. 
 
As regards the notion of restriction, some of the earlier case law took the view that there was 
no reason to differentiate between fiscal and regulatory rules. Instead, the same broad notion 
of restriction was employed in both contexts. The ruling in Manninen on the Finnish dividend 
imputation system (i.e. arrangements that mitigate or eliminate economic double taxation of 
dividends)44 represents the high-water mark of the said earlier tax case law. It suffices to 
quote from Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion, which was followed by the Grand Chamber of 
the Court:  
 
Any measure that makes the cross-border transfer of capital more difficult or less 
attractive and is thus liable to deter the investor constitutes a restriction on the 
free movement of capital. In this respect the concept of a restriction of capital 
movements corresponds to the concept of a restriction that the Court has 
developed with regard to the other fundamental freedoms, especially the 
freedom of movement of goods.45 
 
                                                        
42 The Opinions of AG Geelhoed were an important precursor; see in particular Case C-
374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, ECLI:EU:C:2006:139 where he 
sought to set out ‘the fundamental framework for analysis of the application of the free 
movement rules in the direct taxation sphere’ and pointed out the poor fit of some of the 
previous case law with it. 
43 See also eg A. Cordewener, G. Kofler and S. Van Thiel, ‘The Clash between European 
Freedoms and National Direct Tax Law: Public Interest Defences Available to the Member 
States’, (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1951–2000, at 1996–1997, who deplore the 
‘new caution’. 
44 Case C-319/02, Manninen, ECLI:EU:C:2004:484.  
45 Case C-319/02, Manninen, Opinion of AG Kokott, ECLI:EU:C:2004:164, para 28 (footnotes 
omitted). 
However, only two years later the Court underwent a change of heart. The first case where 
this was clearly at work was the Grand Chamber ruling in Kerckhaert.46 The case concerned 
straightforward double taxation. The dividends that the plaintiffs had received on account of 
their investment were first taxed in the source country, France. The dividends were then also 
taxed in Belgium, the country of residence of the taxpayers. The Belgian authorities did not 
take into account the tax that the plaintiffs had already paid. Double taxation is quite clearly a 
disincentive to engage in cross-border investment (the most obvious one, we would say). This 
breed of national rules had been the main target of the Court’s case law ever since the seminal 
judgment in Cassis de Dijon in the late 1970s.47 Yet in Kerckhaert the Court concluded that the 
overlap of French and Belgian law did not create a restriction on free movement of capital. 
The Court stated that the situation in which the plaintiffs found themselves was the result of 
the parallel exercise of fiscal sovereignty by two Member States. European law as it stood did 
not provide the plaintiffs with a remedy. This approach has prevailed since.48 The notion of 
restriction has consequently come to be construed more narrowly in the fiscal than in the 
regulatory context. In the absence of discrimination, the CJEU is unlikely to find that national 
income tax laws restrict economic freedoms.49 
 
A similar adjustment has taken place for justifications. In Bachmann in the early 1990s the 
Court had established that Member States could justify tax rules restricting economic 
freedoms by relying on the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system.50 Yet Bachmann 
did not become a leading case, but rather remained an exception. Step by step, the CJEU raised 
the bar for pleading coherence. For several years, no Member State managed to win a case on 
this ground. In 1992, Member States, acting as masters of the Treaties, amended what is now 
Article 65.1(a) TFEU so as to shelter the differentiated tax treatment of residents and non-
residents from being contested as a restriction on the movement of capital. Yet in 2000, the 
CJEU in Verkooijen construed the provision as merely confirming its previous strict case law 
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rather than as a genuinely new rule.51 At the same time, the CJEU interpreted the justification 
of prevention of tax avoidance in a rather narrow fashion, by means of applying it exclusively 
to ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ in cases such as ICI and Lankhorst-Hohorst.52 
 
By contrast, since the 2005 Marks & Spencer case 53  the Court has become more 
accommodating towards Member State efforts to justify their restrictive rules. In particular, 
the CJEU has ruled in several cases that the exercise of economic freedoms cannot be 
protected if the result is to undermine the allocation of the power to tax among Member 
States.54 This rationale is difficult to distinguish from the fiscal coherence justification55 
(which has also been pleaded again with success, after many years in which, as was pointed 
out, it had become a losing strategy to do so).56 In addition, balanced allocation is connected 
to and serves to broaden the ground of preventing tax avoidance beyond the notion of wholly 
artificial arrangements—in SGI the Court said that even if the restrictive Belgian arm’s length 
legislation in issue was not specifically designed to combat purely artificial arrangements, it 
could nevertheless be justified by a combination of the need to prevent tax avoidance and to 
preserve the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes if there was a risk of base 
erosion.57 Although some of the distinctions drawn in the case law are rather hard to 
understand,58 for our purposes the key point is clear: the Court today is aware of the need to 
respect the integrity of the tax bases of the Member States, and its rulings have evolved 
accordingly. 
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 A good example of this development is Lidl Belgium.59 A German company operated a 
lossmaking permanent establishment in Luxembourg. The company’s attempt to deduct 
losses when determining its tax liabilities in Germany was rejected, although the deduction 
would have been available had the permanent establishment been situated in Germany. The 
Fourth Chamber of the Court found that the German decision restricted freedom of 
establishment, but the restriction was nonetheless justified. The Court noted that income 
generated by the permanent establishment was taxed in Luxembourg. In view of the need to 
preserve allocation of taxing powers between Member States, this meant that losses also had 
to be taken into account in Luxembourg to safeguard the symmetry between taxation of 
profits and deduction of losses, and to avoid the danger of their being taken into account 
twice. While Marks & Spencer had also referred to the aim of preventing tax avoidance, the 
Court did not consider this necessary for justification to be available. The Court established, 
contrary to the views of the Commission and of Advocate General Sharpston,60 that the 
German rules involved were also proportionate. The judges added that Member States were 
allowed to prevent conduct liable to undermine the right to exercise the power of taxation.61 
Lidl Belgium stands in marked contrast to the ruling in Bosal five years earlier,62 where the 
Fifth Chamber of the Court had held that the Netherlands had to allow a Dutch parent 
company to deduct costs relating to subsidiaries established in other Member States despite 
the fact that the Netherlands had no power to tax profits generated by them or their 
distribution, in order to guarantee treatment similar to domestic subsidiaries. In Bosal, the 
Court’s primary concern was to ensure that a company investing abroad was subject to 
exactly the same treatment as a company investing in the home market. Deductions had to be 
allowed even in the absence of taxation of profits. In Lidl Belgium the main concern was to 
ensure that a Member State could exercise its taxing powers. Deductions did not need to be 
granted, since there was no taxation of profits. 
 
In 2014 the Court introduced a further public interest justification, namely combating tax 
havens. In the ruling in Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company, the Grand Chamber remarked 
that this rationale could in principle have justified the relevant British rules on consortium 
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group relief, although on the facts the national law was not drawn sufficiently narrowly.63 In X 
and TBG the Third Chamber established that a discriminatory Dutch tax on dividends paid to 
holding companies in the Netherlands Antilles did not violate the free movement of capital 
rules of the EU Overseas Association Decision, as it was designed to counter the allure of the 
Netherlands Antilles as a tax haven.64 It is clear that this public interest rationale is full of 
possibilities from the perspective of national treasuries. It may indeed serve to assuage some 
of the anxieties that afflict Member States over the effects of free movement of capital, which 
extends to third countries, on their effective capacity to tax. Remarkably, the Court seems to 
have established this new justification of its own motion without being prompted by the 
litigants, as the UK Government had not sought to justify its legislation in Felixstowe.65 To 
quote Peter Wattel: ‘The Court of Justice seems to have the right antenna for the fiscal spirit of 
the times’.66 
 
In sum, the kind of criticism directed against the case law of the CJEU on income taxation in 
the early 2000s would be partially misplaced if reiterated today. The European judges are no 
longer riding roughshod over the tax autonomy of Member States but instead have 
recalibrated some of the basic concepts of free movement law to fit the fiscal context. The case 
law is messy and undoubtedly individual decisions are to be criticised—yet the big picture is 
worth noting. The judicial organ of the EU has responded. Only discriminatory rules count as 
restrictions and even they may prove lawful, especially if they are necessary to protect the 
integrity of the tax base.67 
 
B The Regulatory Response: State Aid Investigations  
 
In the 1990s, a common understanding was that the guidelines on applying the state aid rules 
should be clarified and that the Commission should examine Member State tax laws on the 
basis of those rules.68 This initiative came hand in hand with adoption of the code of conduct69 
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for business taxation and plans to determine which forms of tax competition were to be 
considered harmful.70 Consequently, state aid investigations became a part of the 
Commission’s toolbox to curb tax competition. 
 
Since 2013, the Commission has engaged in a more systematic examination of national tax 
practices in the light of state aid rules. The Commission has asked for information from 
particular Member States on their tax rulings (or, what amounts to the same, written 
interpretations of tax law provided ex ante, in general to multinational corporations).71 
However, after Luxembourg tax rulings ‘granted’ to hundreds of corporations became 
public,72 the Commission extended its requests (and investigation) to all Member States. On 
that basis, the Commission has established that specific Luxembourg, Dutch, Belgian and Irish 
tax rulings were in breach of EU law.73 Other cases are still pending.74 In this way, the 
Commission works against harmful targeted tax competition that provides tax benefits in a 
selective and discriminatory fashion, thus (among other things) distorting competition 
between Member States.  
 
Three remarks seem to us pertinent. First, the Commission is prepared to make active use of 
its power to check the European constitutionality of state aid as a part of a more 
comprehensive tax policy. Secondly, the removal of illegal state aid practices leads to a form of 
negative integration but one that eliminates harmful national tax measures (measures that 
actually undermine national capacity to tax: in some cases of all states, or in most states bar 
the one issuing the tax ruling). This proves that negative integration not only facilitates tax 
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(Hart, 2013), at 128–133. 
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2014.  
73 Commission Decision 2016/1699/EU on the excess profit exemption State Aid scheme 
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74 See generally eg ‘Multinationals seek cover as EU begins tax avoidance battle’, Financial 
Times, 21 October 2015. 
competition but can also be a practical means of tackling it. Thirdly, in terms of the legality or 
illegality of tax regimes, the decision on whether they constitute a form of illegal state aid 
requires confronting them with a general pattern of taxation. In the absence of any European 
tax system that could serve as a yardstick, the deviation is to be determined by reference to 
the national system in question,75 which in turn might limit the effectiveness of this tool in 
tackling inter-state tax competition.  
 
C The Legislative Response: Safeguarding the Power to Tax through Positive Integration   
 
Recent years have witnessed a variety of legislative initiatives to safeguard Member State 
power to tax. In contrast to negative integration, efforts are under way to reconstitute taxing 
powers within the internal market. This includes endeavours to harmonise corporate tax 
systems, to establish a tax on financial transactions, and to impose obligations on taxpayers to 
document tax-related information and on tax administrations to exchange information. We 
will examine these in turn. 
 
For corporate taxation, in July 2016 the Council adopted a Directive to harmonise Member 
States’ anti-tax avoidance measures. 76 This in turn was in response to recent initiatives within 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to tackle tax base 
erosion and artificial profit-shifting from one tax jurisdiction to another.77 More ambitiously, 
the Commission has relaunched proposals for a common and consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCTB).78 The measures aim not at negative integration but, to the contrary, their purpose is 
to ensure that market integration does not undermine effective capacity to tax. The present 
CCCTB proposal sets a different course from the one proposed in 2011.79 In particular, the 
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proposed rules will be compulsory (and not facultative) for multinational groups with 
revenues over 750 million euros. This reflects a clear anti-avoidance purpose. Having said 
that, the mechanics are still largely in line with the previous proposal. First, there would be a 
single scheme for calculating the tax base for multinational groups. This would drastically 
curb tax competition on the basis of tax base disparities. Secondly, groups would be treated as 
one single taxpayer whose profits would be pooled into one consolidated tax base. This single 
base would then be apportioned between the Member States. The criterion used to allocate 
the fractions of the tax base would be the place where the economic activity takes place.80 
This would entail that corporate taxes become payable where the profits have been generated 
(the principle of tax territoriality). Opportunities for aggressive tax planning through profit-
shifting among states would be drastically reduced, given that all profits would be aggregated 
in one consolidated tax base, and the allocation would be proof against formal manipulation of 
financial flows. The functionality of the system would clearly depend on the choice of the 
precise allocation rules. An appropriate weighing of different factors is needed.81 For the sake 
of providing the reader with a full record, it should be said that there has been considerable 
resistance to this allocation element of the proposal, which explains why the Commission has 
separated it from the proposal pertaining to the rules on calculating the common tax base. 82 
The pre-Brexit British government seemed to be leading opposition to the measure, but had 
declared that ‘it will not… stand in the way if other Member States want to push forward with 
the proposal’.83 Brexit renders that of no practical relevance, but other states, previously 
perhaps silent behind British opposition, may come forward to express their (negative) 
position more openly. 
 
The financial crisis that began in 2007/8 brought the idea of imposing a tax on financial 
transactions—the financial transaction tax (FTT) sometimes referred to somewhat 
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imprecisely as the Tobin tax—back on the European agenda. Proposals have been on the table 
to introduce it within the framework of enhanced cooperation: that is, by agreement between 
many but not all Member States, and only applicable to those that agree.84 The purpose of the 
tax is said to be dual: not only to harmonise existing laws but also to make the under-taxed 
financial sector—financial transactions are not subject to value added tax—pay its tax share 
and, in the process, curb short-term financial transactions that do not increase the efficiency 
of the markets and are not welfare enhancing.85 In its most ambitious form, the FTT would 
introduce a new European tax that could serve as a revenue source for the Eurozone (and 
thus fund a Eurozone Treasury). But not only does it still remain to be seen whether and how 
FTT will be implemented, but if it is effectively approved by a limited number of Member 
States, its tax yielding capacity is likely to be rather modest.86 This does not undermine the 
fact that the tax will subject the source of income (and wealth) that benefits the most from the 
single market liable to tax, thus contributing to a fairer balance between economic benefits 
and tax obligations.87 The FTT is thus a paradigmatic example of how taxes could be designed 
so as to achieve that objective.  
 
Finally, administrative cooperation in tax matters is in the process of being transformed. The 
decisive step has been adoption of mandatory automatic exchange of information between tax 
administrations,88 including financial assets89 and tax rulings.90 Cooperation aspires to cover 
the epistemic deficit of tax administrations caused by the compartmentalisation of the tax 
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base into separate jurisdictions. Moreover, the Council has adopted a Directive91 on country 
by country (CBC) reporting obligations for large multinational companies, while the 
Commission has pushed forward public availability of the said information.92 Public country 
by country reporting would not only provide tax administrations with more information and 
help to curb tax avoidance but is also likely to enhance the perception of tax transparency in 
the eyes of citizens. 
 
The three sets of legislative responses represent very different forms of tax integration. 
However, they all point in the same direction: one in which taxes are not necessarily identified 
as market obstacles that should be removed by negative integration but as fundamental 
institutions on the effectiveness of which societal cooperation depends, and whose collection 
is thus to be guaranteed through positive harmonisation. In this sense, the current legislative 
responses might mark a return to an earlier phase of integration when positive tax 
harmonisation was regarded as part and parcel of the process of European integration.93  
 
IV The Changing Constitutional Context: The Rise of Differentiated Integration and the 
Eurocrisis  
 
As already hinted at, proposals for a common corporate tax base and for a financial 
transactions tax should be placed in the changed (and changing) constitutional context 
brought about by two of the arguably greatest shocks that have ever hit the European 
integration project: the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the financial, economic and fiscal 
crises. The former has led to greater reliance on enhanced cooperation, while the latter has 
ignited a broader debate about the need to harmonise and possibly transfer fiscal 
competences to the Union. Both supply of and demand for further Europeanisation of income 
tax law are likely to go up.  
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Treaty provisions enabling enhanced cooperation were inserted in the Treaties in 1997.94 It 
took more than ten years for them to actually be made use of. Regulations adopted on the 
basis of enhanced cooperation are already in force on divorce95 and patents.96  
The financial transaction tax proposal is part of the same dynamic. From the present 
perspective, it is noteworthy that the patent legislation deals with issues subject to 
unanimous decision-making as foreseen in Article 118(2) TFEU, and that it was approved 
despite active resistance by some Member States. Enhanced cooperation broke the deadlock in 
a field where progress had been blocked for decades. Further, this has subsequently been 
approved by the Court. Legal action to stop the proposed legislation failed as the Court held 
that the rule of unanimity only requires unanimity among the participating Member States—
non-participating ones cannot block the venture. 97 So far, none of the legal challenges to 
enhanced cooperation has succeeded.98  
 
This ‘permissive’ approach to what enhanced cooperation requires entails that the hurdle of 
unanimous voting in the Council that for long was thought to prevent positive harmonisation 
in the tax context no longer stands as high as was thought.99 If Member States wish to 
proceed, they may be able to do so despite objections. The real question is not the legal 
                                                        
94 The Treaty of Amsterdam originally introduced closer cooperation for areas covered by the 
EC Treaty and for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, under conditions set out 
in Arts 43-45 TEU. 
95 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ L 343, of 29.12.2010, 10–16. 
96 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection OJ 
L 361, of 31 December 2012, 1–8; Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to 
the applicable translation arrangements, OJ L 361, of 31.12.2012, 89–92; and  
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, OJ C 175, of 20.6.2013, 1–40. 
97 Joined Cases C-274 and 295/11, Spain and Italy v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240. For 
background and critical commentary, see eg F. Fabbrini, 'Enhanced Cooperation under 
Scrutiny: Revisiting the Law and Practice of Multi-Speed Integration in Light of the First 
Involvement of the EU Judiciary', (2013) 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 197–224.  
98 See Case C-209/13, United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:283 for the FTT. 
99 Even before these developments, enhanced cooperation had been called the ‘best hope for 
those who favour further direct tax integration’ in M. O’Brien, ‘Company Taxation, State Aid 
and Fundamental Freedoms: Is the Next Step Enhanced Cooperation?’, (2005) 30 European 
Law Review 209–233, at 233.  
feasibility of harmonisation but the political will to make it effective.100 Having said that, not 
all legal issues have been settled, and this may affect political calculations.101 In particular in 
the context of the FTT proposal, discussion has focused on its allegedly extraterritorial effects. 
The wide reach of the proposal may be helpful in ensuring that the objectives of enhanced 
cooperation are not frustrated by the strategic behaviour of economic actors, but its 
compatibility with both public international law and EU law has been questioned.102 In 
general, the more leeway the participating Member States enjoy in managing the strategic 
responses of taxpayers, the more likely they are to agree to enhanced cooperation.103 
 
At the same time, the Eurocrisis has increased calls for further EU action in tax matters, 
especially within the Eurozone. This comprises at least four aspects. First, Member States are 
not only still reeling from the impact of the financial crisis but also struggling to meet new and 
tighter fiscal rules that set ceilings to debt and deficit levels, and now also establish 
compulsory trajectories of reduction and automatic mechanisms reducing expenditure if 
fiscal targets are not met. As a result, states have become much less tolerant of so-called ‘tax 
planning strategies’, indeed so much so that referring to some of them as ‘aggressive’ has 
become standard jargon. As explained in previous sections, the EU is already providing 
Member States with assistance, in particular through its state aid investigations and by means 
of fostering greater tax transparency. Additionally, a drive is under way to make the EU more 
active in the global struggle of the OECD against practices that erode the capacity of states to 
effectively tax (the so-called ‘base erosion’), including the formal shifting of profits among 
jurisdictions.104 Even if views have differed somewhat about the specific role that the EU 
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should play, a consensus seems to have emerged that the Union should not undermine OECD 
efforts,105 and the EU has very recently managed to adopt legislation in the area, coordinating 
Member State approaches through minimum harmonisation.106  
 
Secondly, calls for ‘completion’ of the economic union (clearly the less developed and less 
robust part of economic and monetary union) have increased dramatically. This is said to 
require the setting of EU standards on ‘certain aspects of tax policy (for example the corporate 
tax base).’107 The proclaimed aim is to ensure that all Member States make their economic 
structures resilient so that they can absorb shocks internally. Clearly, the economies of the 
Eurozone states are closely related, so the ‘bad’ policies of any state are likely to affect all 
states. Consequently, every state has a clear interest in all others applying sound economic 
policies.  
 
Thirdly, initiatives have been taken so as to create ‘deeper and more integrated’ capital 
markets in Europe (the so-called ‘capital markets union’) and, in particular, to encourage the 
private sector to participate in cross-border risk sharing.108 Tax issues are bound to be at the 
core of this specific project. More integrated capital markets require ‘neutral treatment for 
different but comparable activities and investments across jurisdictions‘.109 On a more 
practical level, the Commission is, for example, investigating whether national tax systems 
create barriers to cross-border distribution of investment funds and preparing a code of 
conduct on the principles to be applied to ensure relief in respect of withholding taxes (that is, 
of amounts retained by the source state).110 
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106 Directive 2016/1164/EU laying down rules against tax avoidance practices, n 76 above. 
107 Commission, ‘Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union: Report by Jean-Claude 
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to an extent sheltered by returns from cross-border investments, and if local sources of 
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109 Ibid. 
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Finally, it has been argued that the Eurozone needs to put in place a proper common 
macroeconomic policy, so as to ensure centralised macroeconomic stabilisation of the 
Eurozone economy. This would provide the Eurozone with the means to deal with shocks that 
Member States are incapable of handling through unilateral action. The obvious question is 
how stabilisation policies (to the extent that they involve public expenditure) will be funded. 
More recent proposals have avoided this issue, but earlier proposals, such as the 
Commission’s blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU, referred (again) to the need to equip the 
Union with a genuine autonomous power to tax.111 
 
What emerges from this changing constitutional context is that both the supply of and the 
demand for EU action on tax have increased. On the supply side, the availability of enhanced 
cooperation and the Court’s permissive attitude towards it makes it easier to engage in 
harmonisation. On the demand side, the consequences and lessons of the Eurocrisis point 
towards the need for more European action. Arguably, both the renewed push for the CCCTB 




In this article we have argued that the simple narrative according which market integration 
necessarily leads to erosion of the ability of Member States to tax income is not persuasive, 
despite its being logically consistent. No evidence suggests a decline of aggregate tax revenue. 
What we find is a possible shift of the tax burden (and increasingly of the tax design) from 
mobile to immobile tax bases (and taxpayers). Nevertheless, the dangers implicit in the 
present division of powers between the Union and Member States as to income taxation 
should not be ignored, in particular as these powers stand at the core of the broader 
problematique of the distributional consequences of internationalisation of economic activity; 
or what is the same, of the correlation between globalisation (in the shape of 
Europeanisation) and the growth of inequalities.112 We argue that European institutions have 
reacted or are in the process of reacting. The case law of the Court of Justice has been 
recalibrated. The Commission is actively using its powers in the field of state aid to tackle 
                                                        
111 Commission Communication, ‘A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union: Launching a European Debate’ COM(2012) 777 final/2, eg at 33. See Menéndez, n 93 
above, at 37 for a highly critical view.  
112 See also the article by M. Ferrera in this issue. 
targeted tax competition. Important secondary legislation has been adopted or is in the 
pipeline. Taken together, these responses represent a broad-based and reasonably coherent 
attempt to address the challenges. Further, the changed wider constitutional context has 
provided the EU both with more tools and with more reasons to engage actively in this field.  
 
The ball is now in the court of the Member States. Do they have the political will—or, better, 
the incentives—to engage constructively in the field of taxation? Or do they remain 
stubbornly committed to the dogma of tax sovereignty and all that it entails? As proposals for 
a deep and genuine economic and monetary union have argued, much of the success of the 
integration project may hinge on this. 
 
As a historically evolving institution, taxation is sensitive to changes in its social and legal 
context. Since the emergence of the tax state in Europe, taxation has been harnessed to serve 
the most fundamental government functions, which has guided the design of tax systems in 
nation states. Yet while national tax policy making is still premised on these purposes, it now 
takes place in a changed economic context and under a transformed economic constitution. 
Internationally integrated capital markets have transnationalised financial relations and 
rendered financial assets reactive to differentials in non-integrated national policy fields. The 
liberalisation of transnational capital movements entails the mobility of a large proportion of 
national tax bases. In other words, international economic mobility, fostered further in 
Europe by the economic freedoms, sets a new framework for national taxation. The national 
functions of taxation have remained, but the conditions for their realisation have changed.113 
The design of tax laws has become more dependent on decisions of economic actors, and in 
some cases the differentiation between public and private spheres has even been blurred.114  
 
In particular since the 1980s, tax policies have taken into account the responsiveness of both 
out-bound and in-bound capital flows. In this sense, the transnational integration of capital 
markets has extended its effects on tax policies, just as on other areas of regulation. Some 
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have argued that this has contributed to a crisis in the tax state (a state that extracts the 
revenues for public expenditure predominantly through taxation), which may be displaced by 
the debt or consolidation state.115 Moreover, concerns exist that European welfare regimes 
have become entangled, challenging domestic redistributive policies that have implemented 
national commitments to solidarity. From this perspective, the present shape of the European 
microeconomic constitution and global financial integration has put into doubt the tradition 
of a socially embedded market economy.116 The challenge is to reconcile post-war social 
traditions and extant transnational economies.  
 
While the transnationalisation of capital movements in Europe has presented a challenge for 
redistributive policies, the EU may also provide Member States with an array of tools to 
respond and to reconstitute commitments to solidarity. The financial and subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis brought into discourse the principles of the European macroeconomic 
constitution—European rules on fiscal and monetary policies. Sovereign debt arrangements 
between Member States have provoked questions on European solidarity: whether fiscal self-
responsibility should be sustained to the full or joint liability for obligations be introduced. 
Although taxation has to some extent been absent from debates, it is inevitably implicated.  
 
European tax solidarity does not necessarily entail radical moves such as the pooling of tax 
revenues between Member States. It may also take a more modest form. Rather than 
replacing states, integration may be harnessed to strengthen them. This may take place 
through active use in the field of taxation of legislative powers that are already pooled. This 
would remedy the previous over-reliance on the judicial branch for reconciliation of the 
internal market and national tax systems. If Member States are prepared to put limits on their 
formally unfettered national autonomy,117 they can better manage the risks inherent in the 
internationalisation of capital movements. Transnationalisation of tax solidarity would 
provide an alternative to the plurality of interdependent fiscal regimes that are left to engage 
in tax competition and to bear individually the risks that competition engenders. Solidarity 
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through European tax legislation would present a counterpart to economic 
interdependence.118 Whether transnationalised legal solidarity corresponds to the social 
reality of Europe, whether the societal preconditions exist for European solidarity on the level 
of civil society, is a question not to be neglected. However, an equally crucial question is 
whether commitments to national solidarity can persist without being complemented by 
European legislative solidarity between Member States. Solidary exercise of legislative 
powers on taxation, balancing competition-inducing non-integration, might promote the 
concrete realisation of national solidarity, in particular if coupled with an EU judiciary that is 
sensitive to the integrity of national tax bases and EU regulators that police harmful targeted 
tax competition. In recent tax trends within the EU, a push in this direction can be observed. 
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